Privilege as Property by Walker, Bela A.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 42 Privilege Revealed: Past, Present, & Future 
2013 
Privilege as Property 
Bela A. Walker 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bela A. Walker, Privilege as Property, 42 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 047 (2013), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol42/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
47 
Privilege as Property 
Bela August Walker  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, after the election of President Barack Obama, voices 
throughout the nation rose up to declare the beginning of a new epoch 
in U.S. history: We have now moved beyond race.
1
 The vocabulary 
of colorblindness dates back to at least the nineteenth century, when 
Justice John Marshall Harlan first declared, “[o]ur constitution is 
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”2 
Entering the third millennium, rhetoric now focuses on our “post-
racial America.”3 In the second term of our seemingly racially 
transcendental president, however, this symposium looks backwards, 
all the way to the distant 1990s, to revisit Stephanie M. Wildman’s 
Privilege Revealed: How Invisible Preference Undermines America.
4
 
 
  
Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law; J.D. (2003), 
Columbia Law School; A.B. (1999), Bryn Mawr College. For their sage advice and discerning 
counsel, I am indebted to M.J. Durkee, Reena Vaidya Krishna, Gowri Ramachandran, Patricia 
Williams, and, above all, to Jennifer Flynn Walker, whose enduring insight and patience proved 
equally essential to this project. Greatest thanks to Jennifer Witt and the staff of the Washington 
University Journal of Law & Policy for their excellent editing. 
 1. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1 (“Barack Hussein Obama was elected the 44th president of the 
United States on Tuesday, sweeping away the last racial barrier in American politics with ease 
as the country chose him as its first black chief executive.”); Shelby Steele, Op-Ed., Obama’s 
Post-Racial Promise, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at 31. 
 2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In the same 
breath, however, he also underscored the dominance of the “white race . . . in prestige, in 
achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power . . .” and his expectation that such 
preeminence would “continue to be for all time . . .” Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Clarence Lusane, Obama’s Victory and the Myth of Post-Racialism, in 
APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., CHANGING THE RACE: RACIAL POLITICS AND THE ELECTION OF 
BARACK OBAMA 67, 68 (Linda Burnham ed., 2009), available at http://www.arc.org/down 
loads/RaceElections_1_R5.pdf. See also Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 
1597 98 (2009) (“[P]ost-racialism . . . signals a racially transcendent event that authorizes the 
retreat from race. Colorblindness, in comparison, offers a largely normative claim for a retreat 
from race that is aspirational in nature.”). 
 4. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE 
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In reassessing the continuing salience of these works, the nation 
appears not as “post” as some might like to imagine. To the contrary, 
the call to “move beyond race” highlights the materiality of 
Wildman’s demand that “privilege must be made visible.”5 Indeed, 
we must talk about privilege—in particular, about the law and 
privilege—if we are to ever halt its perpetuation.6 In this quest, my 
Essay employs Cheryl Harris’s Whiteness as Property alongside 
Wildman’s text. Written four years prior to Privilege Revealed, 
Harris’s germinal work exposes the tangible property implications of 
whiteness, ones created from legal texts and embedded in legal 
actions.
7
 The coupled insights of these two scholars illuminate the 
continued impact of discrimination and discriminatory privilege in 
the legal world. 
II. PRIVILEGE AS PERSONAL 
Both Wildman and Harris begin their explorations with the 
personal, recounting stories of privilege and detriment. As part of this 
historic foray, I looked into my own past as well. At the beginning of 
my legal career, on the precipice of entering law school, I observed: 
 My life has always been a study of race. You can’t grow up 
in an interracial family and ever believe that color does not 
matter. Race always matters. Regardless of the environment 
created within the confines of your own home, you always 
have to cross the threshold and face the world. Out there, the 
color of your skin comes first. 
 I cannot remember a time when I was not aware of my 
racial identity. Throughout my childhood, I watched myself 
constructed in the eyes of those around me, as I had to explain 
myself at every turn. Even a simple thing like placing my 
family photos in my junior high locker became a site of 
conflict as classmates bombarded me with comments.  
 
UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996) [hereinafter PRIVILEGE REVEALED] (with contributions by 
Margalynne Armstrong, Adrienne D. Davis & Trina Grillo).  
 5. Id. at 13. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1714 n.10 (1993). 
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 “Who’s that?” 
 “But he’s so dark!”  
 “Are they adopted?” I never came up with the right answer 
to the last one, only a resolute “no”, though it was always on 
the tip of my tongue to follow up with, “Why, are you?” I 
would mumble through the litany: No, that’s actually my half-
brother/half-sister; no, we all have different fathers; you see, 
their fathers are black; no, I’m white. Those words framed my 
existence, my difference reinforced each time I explained yet 
again something that I had always taken as intrinsic and 
elemental. 
 My brother and sister often talk about finding their way 
between two worlds of color, the archetypal dilemma of 
biracial children who are never quite white and never quite 
black. I watched them do it, at times literally carried piggyback 
on these voyages. Trailing alongside my older siblings, I also 
learned to move between worlds. I had home, a domain 
controlled by my parents where our multiracial family was the 
norm and all of my cousins came in a different color. There no 
one asked questions or required justifications. In dissonance 
stood the outside world we confronted together, where walking 
down the street meant entering contested territory and waiters 
asked us if we wanted separate checks.  
 Each of us had our own worlds we maneuvered separately. 
My brother and sister navigated paths I could not follow, 
maturing as African-Americans in face of a hostile and 
overwhelmingly racist world. In the process, they passed on 
glimpses from the other side and various nuggets of wisdom. I 
struggled through my own questions of identity, learning how 
to frame myself as white, as Jewish, as queer, and, always, as 
part of an interracial family.  
 In the end, I do not carry the colors of their skin around 
with me; I only bring my own. Nonetheless, I always bear my 
family on my back as my brother and sister once did for me. 
Moreover, while my siblings undertake important work in 
fighting the racism they confront daily, my family taught me 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that I have equally crucial obligations. Living as white in the 
United States, I benefit from the same system that 
discriminates against them, one with prejudices so insidious I 
even find them within myself. This privilege simultaneously 
bequeaths me with responsibility. 
In the end, while it’s a seemingly obvious conclusion—though 
perhaps one that felt more profound at the time—when I reflect on 
the nature of privilege today, particularly racial privilege, I remain 
alarmed at how unfamiliar the concept persists for many and how 
rarely it is discussed. Throughout my journeys, I saw the persistent 
effects of white privilege on my siblings and on myself. The 
recognition and analysis of these impacts, however, appeared far less 
frequently.  
III. REVEALING PRIVILEGE 
In Privilege Revealed, Wildman tackles this absence. Her work 
attempts to make the assumed explicit, thus exposing the invisible 
aspects of privilege. Whiteness is an integral part of life in the United 
States. We use it as a factor in daily conversation, a convenient 
shorthand for physical appearance, usually considered as 
uncomplicated a descriptor as tall or short. As children, we’re taught 
to identify whiteness or lack thereof instantly, an instinctive line 
drawing which serves to shape social interactions and delineate one’s 
relationship to others.
8
 While the exact socialization process differs 
depending on which community you grow up in and its ethnic 
composition, the skills of racial differentiation are always imparted 
before reaching adulthood.
9
 
Lines of privilege need clear demarcations: people seek to know 
race and sex at first glance. Similarly, we expect everyone to fall 
promptly within the appropriate box of class and sexuality. Wildman 
illustrates, “[i]magine how long you could have a discussion with or 
 
 8. See, e.g., Robert Westley, First-Time Encounters: “Passing” Revisited and 
Demystification as a Critical Practice, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 300 (2000) (“Americans 
are wont to surmise the racial identity of those persons with whom they come into contact. The 
criteria for making racial judgments are social and automatic.”). 
 9. Id. 
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about someone without knowing her or his gender.”10 As a parent, I 
can now confirm the inability of most individuals to address even a 
newborn baby without first clarifying, “Is it a girl or a boy?”11 
In Privilege Revealed, Stephanie Wildman exposes privilege as a 
“systemic conferral of benefit and advantage,” triggered not by merit 
but by “affiliation, conscious or not and chosen or not, to the 
dominant side of a power system.”12 In this way, certain individuals 
actively acquire or passively absorb unmerited rewards solely based 
on their membership in a privileged group. The essential examples 
Wildman examines are race, class, gender, and sexuality. Further 
potential categories not explicitly engaged in the text include status 
based on citizenship, ethnicity, color, education, or language ability. 
Wildman identifies two foundational elements of privilege: first, 
that “the characteristics of the privileged group define the societal 
norm” and second, that “privileged group members can rely on their 
privilege and avoid objecting to oppression” of others.13 As a result, 
this system of benefits is rendered invisible, making it all the more 
invidious. By accentuating advantages previously obscured, Wildman 
emphasizes discrimination not merely as a phenomenon that 
disadvantages certain unfortunate individuals, but also as a social 
force that actively advantages others. Such visibility, Wildman 
proposes, is one way to counter the destructive effects of privilege. 
By shifting the focus from discrimination to privilege, Wildman 
fundamentally reorients the conversation: from oppressed to 
oppressor, from minority to majority. The discussion of prejudice no 
longer relies on the “victim.”14 Similarly, the conversation is no 
longer about the “racists”—and how to avoid being one of those 
people—but about white supremacy, which is systemic and 
systematic oppression that implicates society as a whole.
15
 
The crucial distinction between privilege and racial 
discrimination, as Wildman so adroitly explains, is that privilege is 
institutional. As Harris had previously described, the term “white 
 
 10. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 4, at 9. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 29.  
 13. Id. at 13.  
 14. See id. at 5.  
 15. Id.  
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supremacy” referenced “a political, economic, and cultural system in 
which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, 
conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement 
are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white 
subordination are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions 
and social settings.”16 White supremacy touches all of us because it is 
embedded in society, not just in the psyches of certain individuals. 
Regardless of whether such benefits were unrequested or even 
unwanted, they ultimately affect everyone endowed with white skin. 
IV. PROPERTIES OF WHITENESS 
Cheryl Harris’s Whiteness as Property17 has framed the debate on 
race and property ever since its publication. Harris’s work exposes 
how whiteness has tangible property implications created out of legal 
text and legal action.
18
 In Whiteness as Property, Cheryl Harris 
characterizes whiteness “as the embodiment of white privilege 
[which] transcended mere belief or preference.”19 Whiteness is 
“usable property” enjoyed by a white person “whenever she t[akes] 
advantage of the privileges accorded white people simply by virtue of 
their whiteness.”20 
As Harris recounts, Albion Tourgee, counsel for Homer Plessy in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, first advanced the legal theory of whiteness as 
property.
21
 Tourgee argued that when Plessy was ousted from a 
whites-only railway car despite outwardly appearing white, Plessy 
lost valuable reputational rights.
22
 Tourgee explained that “the 
reputation of belonging to the dominant race . . . is property, in the 
same sense that a right of action or of inheritance is property.”23 He 
further submitted that “[p]robably most white persons if given a 
 
 16. Harris, supra note 7, at 1714 (quoting Frances L. Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, 
Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024 n.129 
(1989)). 
 17. Harris, supra note 7. 
 18. Id. at 1731 37. 
 19. Id. at 1734. 
 20. Id. 
 21. 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896). 
 22. Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 8, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210). 
 23. Id. 
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choice, would prefer death to life in the United States as colored 
persons.”24 Consequently, he asserted, “[u]nder these conditions, is it 
possible to conclude that the reputation of being white is not 
property? Indeed, is it not the most valuable sort of property, being 
the master-key that unlocks the golden door of opportunity?”25 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “property” is “[t]he right to 
possess, use, and enjoy a determinate thing . . . .”26 or in the “‘widest 
sense . . . includes all a person’s legal rights . . . .’”27 Whiteness 
determined legal entitlements by delineating what rights one could 
obtain in property, such as limiting claims to possession instead of 
full ownership
28
 or restricting leases under the Alien Land Laws.
29
 
During periods of slavery and state segregation, racial boundaries and 
legal rights were manipulated as the political economy required, such 
as through the installation of rigid Jim Crow regulations. 
Whiteness and privilege are not within our normal conceptions of 
property: they are not real estate or goods sold on the open market, 
but human characteristics. My whiteness does not seem tangible: I 
can’t hold it, can’t eat it, can’t sell it, can’t even get rid it. It’s simply 
there, an innate characteristic like the sound of my voice and the 
shape of my nose. As many scholars have detailed, however, there’s 
nothing particularly intrinsic about race.
30
 Likewise, what constitutes 
property is hardly inborn. Property and property rights are legally 
constructed, created, and upheld by law and government coercion. 
 
 24. Id. at 9. 
 25. Id. 
 26. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (9th ed. 2009) (citation omitted). 
 27. Id. at 1336 (quoting JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 423 24 (Glanville L. Williams 
ed., 10th ed. 1947)). 
 28. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823) (“[T]he Indian 
inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in 
the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to 
others.”). 
 29. The various Alien Land Laws denied the right to purchase real property to persons 
unable to obtain citizenship in the United States, which in practice meant the Japanese and other 
Asian groups. ALFRED L. BROPHY, ALBERTO LOPEZ & KALI N. MURRAY, INTEGRATING 
SPACES: PROPERTY LAW AND RACE 89 98 (2010). 
 30. The tremendous amount of work describing the development of racial ideology would 
take volumes to detail. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK?: ONE NATION’S 
DEFINITION 82 (1993); Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial 
Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161 (1997).  
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Not all such goods are tangible: Property can exist in a pension fund, 
the ability to walk on a path or a dance sequence.  
Property is ultimately a social category, describing neither the 
bare ownership of things nor the relationship between owners and 
things but a set of legal relationships among people.
31
 In property 
class, I often employ that foundational notion of property termed the 
“bundle of sticks.”32 The sticks of a property entitlement generally 
include: (a) the right of disposition—the ability to buy or sell; (b) the 
right of possession—to own or occupy; (c) the right of control—to be 
able to control the use; (d) the right of enjoyment—to be able to use 
and profit from the property in any legal manner; and lastly, (e) the 
right of exclusion—the ability to deny others access to your particular 
good. 
Most of our notions of privilege seem to lack the first quality: the 
right of disposition. Privilege is typically nontransferable: an 
individual cannot assign her race or sex to someone else. As Margaret 
Radin and others have shown, however, alienability is not a necessary 
condition for property.
33
 A person owns his prescription drugs even 
though he can’t sell them to another. No one else can take title to 
your law degree, but courts have nonetheless recognized it as 
property with clear cognizable value.
34
 The majority of one’s body 
parts are inalienable, but we designate them as property in a myriad 
of circumstances.
35
 For Harris, the inalienability of whiteness does 
not remove it from the realm of property, but merely enhances its 
worth.
36
 
 
 31. See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES, at v (2007) (“[P]roperty at its core entails the right to exclude others from some 
discrete thing.”).  
 32. The rights bundle is a long established property trope. See, e.g., JOHN LEWIS, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 55, at 43 (1888) (“The 
dullest individual among the people knows and understands that his property in anything is a 
bundle of rights.”).  
 33. Margaret Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
 34. See, e.g., O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that a medical 
license constitutes marital property subject to equitable distribution); Woodworth v. 
Woodworth, 337 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a law degree constitutes 
marital property subject to distribution upon the dissolution of the marriage). 
 35. See Lyria Bennett Moses, The Applicability of Property Law in New Contexts: From 
Cells to Cyberspace, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 639, 643 45 (2008). 
 36. Harris, supra note 7, at 1734. 
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Taking away this first right of alienability as not essential to 
property, the last right is where Harris and others focus: the right to 
exclude. Described by the Supreme Court as “‘one of the most 
essential sticks in the bundle of rights,’”37 the right to exclude has 
long been considered a core value of property. The maintenance of 
privilege necessitates the ability to exclude others from access. If all 
can freely obtain the advantages of the privileged group, the now 
unrestricted benefit correspondingly depreciates.
38
 
In the United States, whiteness “entails the right to use and 
enjoyment, manifests as reputation and status, and entails an absolute 
right to exclude.”39 Whiteness continues to confer “tangible and 
economically valuable benefits” as Harris originally discussed.40 In 
one experiment, Andrew Hacker asked a group of white students how 
much money they would seek if they were changed from white to 
black in their sleep. They estimated about “$50 million, or $1 million 
for each coming black year.”41 While hardly a scientific estimate of 
the value of whiteness, Hacker’s figure illustrates some of the 
perceived benefit of whiteness. 
V. REVEALING PRIVILEGE AS PROPERTY 
Struggles over the status of persons of African descent have been 
a central feature in the United States narrative since its inception. 
These concepts provide more than mere historical background: 
Recognition as a white person has been, and continues to be, a highly 
significant and contested category. Notwithstanding the existence of 
civil rights legislation and significant changes in social practice, 
white racial identity persists as a valued state. 
 
 37. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (citation omitted); see also 
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731 (1998) 
(“[T]he right to exclude others is a necessary and sufficient condition of identifying the 
existence of property.”). 
 38. See Bela August Walker, Fractured Bonds: Policing Whiteness and Womanhood 
through Race-Based Marriage Annulments, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (“Within the 
ideology of white supremacy, . . . [t]he sanctity of the privileges endowed by whiteness required 
the same degree of certitude as embodied in other property rights.”). 
 39. e. christi cunningham, Identity Markets, 45 HOW. L.J. 491, 530 (2002). 
 40. Harris, supra note 7, at 1726. 
 41. ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, 
UNEQUAL 32 (1992). 
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Whiteness retains a corporeal presence through its material impact 
on daily life. Harris characterizes whiteness as a concrete entity that 
one can “use and enjoy[].”42 The analysis of whiteness as property 
implicates the nature of white privilege. Under this lens, whiteness 
ceases to be an immutable biological trait but instead a social 
construction that provides power and can be used to further 
oppression. This understanding of race requires acknowledgment that 
“recognizing oneself as ‘white’ necessarily assumes premises based 
on white supremacy” and that white skin implicitly deploys white 
privilege and racial subjugation.
43
 
In contrast with Wildman’s formulation of covert privilege, the 
nature of property is to be conspicuous. Nonetheless, the language of 
property may be an apt way to discuss racial advantage; recent 
studies show that people may be more aware of their whiteness than 
we expect.
44
 Even when whiteness is concrete and visible, however, 
the existence of the advantages that adhere to it are often ignored. 
Harris and Wildman both “seek[] to develop the vocabulary 
needed for an understanding of the interlocking systems of privilege 
that serve to perpetuate the status quo of privilege and 
subordination.”45 Their work provides merely a starting point; as 
Wildman reflects, “[o]nce the hierarchy is made visible, the problems 
remain no less complex, but it becomes possible to discuss them in a 
more revealing and useful fashion.”46 Harris utilizes property as her 
theoretical building block. 
The legalized racial segregation that Harris references is no longer 
germane. While systematic property dispossession has occurred 
repeatedly in the nation’s history—from slavery and the Alien Land 
Acts to redlining and racial covenants
47—race is no longer the legal 
determinative for who can be bought or sold or may contract for 
 
 42. Harris, supra note 7, at 1734. 
 43. Id. at 1737. 
 44. See, e.g., Paul R. Croll, Explanations for Racial Disadvantage and Racial Advantage: 
Beliefs About Both Sides of Inequality in America, 36 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 47 (2013); Paul 
R. Croll, Modeling Determinants of White Racial Identity: Results from a New National Survey, 
86 SOC. FORCES. 614 (2007). 
 45. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 4, at 5. 
 46. Id. at 24. 
 47. For an extensive, albeit not exhaustive, history of racial restrictions and property, see 
generally BROPHY ET AL., supra note 29, passim.  
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property. At the same time, variations of these racially based property 
restrictions persist.  
Local zoning regulations, for example, have served for decades to 
exclude groups and “keep social and fiscal undesirables out of [] 
communities.”48 The first racially restrictive zoning ordinances 
appeared in San Francisco in the 1880s;
49
 while outlawed by the 
Supreme Court in 1917, the full impact of the ruling took several 
decades to wind its way through the state courts.
50
 A newer 
incarnation of racial zoning restrictions bars residents from renting 
property to undocumented immigrants within the proscribed town 
limits.
51
 Once in court, these ordinances have not withstood legal 
challenge, but on the ground, they proliferate.
52
 Similarly, while an 
open market in people no longer exists, race determines the 
placement of children through adoption. For those seeking to adopt, a 
white baby generally requires greater financial expenditures than a 
baby with black ancestry.
53
 Reduced market demand for children 
deemed less desirable—i.e., older or disabled or of color—has 
lowered the asking price.
54
 The influence of white privilege and the 
property of whiteness perserveres. 
 
 48. See Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective 
Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1993). 
 49. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (holding the law unconstitutional). 
 50. See EDWARD M. BASSET, ZONING: THE LAWS, ADMINISTRATION AND COURT 
DECISIONS DURING THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 49 50 (1940); Dubin, supra note 48, at 750 
n.49; A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., De Jure Housing Segregation in the United States and 
South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit for Racial Justice, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 856 62 (1990). 
 51. Marisa Bono, Don’t You Be My Neighbor: Restrictive Housing Ordinances as the 
New Jim Crow, 3 MOD. AM. 29, 29 (2007). For a review of current legislation, see NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2012 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS 
IN THE STATES (JAN. 1 JUNE 30, 2012) (Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/ 
1/Documents/immig/2012ImmigrationReportJuly.pdf; ALA. CODE § 31-13-33 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2012) (criminalizing “entering into a rental agreement . . . with an alien to provide 
accommodations, if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien is 
unlawfully present in the United States”). 
 52. See also Rose Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At the 
Intersection of Property, Race, and Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979, 982 84 (2010); 
Bono, supra note 51, at 35. 
 53. See Michele Goodwin, The Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 
26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 61, 66 69 (2006).  
 54. David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man: Intellectual 
Property, Commodification, and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1197 (2005) 
(describing “‘standard’ and ‘special’ prices reflected the premiums paid for white and other 
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VI. CONCLUSION—MOVING PAST PRIVILEGE? 
In our current “post-racial America” (exemplified for some by the 
election of an African-American president), an ever-widening racial 
economic divide continues. Access to education, employment, and 
income remain racially differentiated.
55
 Even as income disparities 
decline, contemporary wealth differentials demonstrate the tenacious 
legacy of white supremacy, which limited access to property for 
generations, such that the median net worth of white households is 
eighteen times greater than that of Latino households and twenty 
times greater than that of black households.
56
 The historical legacy is 
clear: the current wealthiest African-American families trace back to 
the most moneyed families at the turn of the twentieth century.
57
 For 
the rest of the population, things have only deteriorated in the twenty-
first century: due to the concentration of minority assets in the family 
home, the wealth gap has doubled since the recession began.
58
  
As it turns out, we’ve been in this place before in centuries past.59 
A mere eighteen years after slavery, the United States Supreme Court 
proclaimed racial discrimination to be no longer a pressing legal 
concern.
60
 Luckily, subsequent courts disagreed. Similarly, the 
 
desirable children and the discount available for ‘older, black and other handicapped children’” 
(quoting Patricia J. Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 913, 919 (1994))). 
 55. Spencer Overton, Racial Disparities and the Political Function of Property, 49 UCLA 
L. REV. 1553, 1554 n.3 (2002) (“[T]ypical white households control an income stream that is 
about 156 percent of that controlled by African American and Latino households.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 56. Miriam Jordan, White-Minority Wealth Gulf Widens, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2011. 
 57. Palma Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89 
OR. L. REV. 453, 457 (2010).  
 58. Jordan, supra note 56. Because of this concentration of capital, the “financial wealth 
(net worth minus equity in owner-occupied housing)” of white households was ninety times 
greater than that of African-American households. CHUCK COLLINS ET AL., SHIFTING 
FORTUNES: THE PERILS OF THE GROWING AMERICAN WEALTH GAP 57 (1999). 
 59. Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-race Equal Protection?, 
98 GEO. L.J. 967, 972 (2010) (“Professing American society to be post-racial is not new. 
Almost from the moment the Civil War ended and the Thirteenth Amendment abolished 
slavery, there were declarations that the United States had moved beyond race.”). 
 60. See United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“When a man has emerged from 
slavery, and . . . has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some 
stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be 
the special favorite of the laws . . .”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol42/iss1/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013]  Privilege as Property 59 
 
 
contemporary push to deemphasize race highlights the continued 
need to reveal privilege and engage the role it plays in society—and 
renders the Harris and Wildman accounts all the more relevant today. 
Wildman initially urged attention to privilege, since “[a]ttacking 
discrimination alone cannot result in an end to subordination, because 
systems of privilege regenerate the discriminatory patterns that 
maintain existing hierarchies of oppression.”61 The greater the 
invisibility of privilege, the harder it is to fight these regenerated 
discriminatory patterns. In the end, this may be all talk, but even talk, 
as Wildman has shown us, is nevertheless urgent and critical as 
“[l]aw plays an important role in the perpetuation of privilege by 
ignoring that privilege exists. And by ignoring its existence, law, with 
help from our language, ensures the perpetuation of privilege.”62 
 
 61. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 4, at 5. 
 62. Id. at 13. 
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